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Abstract
We introduce the topic of this Special Issue on the ‘‘Role of Financial and Legal
Institutions in International Governance’’, with a particular emphasis on a
notion of ‘‘international mobility of corporate governance’’. Our discussion
places the Special Issue at the intersection of law, finance, and international
business, with a focus on the contexts of foreign investors and directors.
Country-level legal and regulatory institutions facilitate foreign ownership,
foreign directors, raising external financial capital, and international M&A
activity. The interplay between the impact of foreign ownership and foreign
directors on firm governance and performance depends on international
differences in formal/regulatory institutions. In addition to legal conditions,
informal institutions such as political connections also shape the economic
value of foreign ownership and foreign directors. We highlight key papers in the
literature, provide an overview of the new papers in this Special Issue, and offer
suggestions for future research.
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INTRODUCTION
International Business (IB), economics and finance scholars have
developed a significant body of research focused on the interna-
tional mobility of capital, labor and goods. Two main theoretical
approaches to international business strategy – internalization
theory and the resource-based view (RBV) – assume that the most
efficient firm strategy will be that which maximizes rents from the
firm-specific assets and thus maximizes the long-run value of the
firm. The role of management in such theories is essentially to
identify and implement this efficient strategy. Organizational
control processes are equally important in terms of creating value
in the context of globalization. These processes facilitate account-
ability, monitoring and trust within and outside of the firm, and
should ultimately lead to improvements in the firm’s performance
and long-term survival.
Although prior IB and international finance studies have iden-
tified a number of governance factors that may affect global
strategy both at the headquarter and subsidiary levels of a
multinational company (MNC), this research generally considers
corporate governance functions and processes as being location-
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specific (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). The underly-
ing assumption in the vast majority of governance
papers in the context of globalization is that
governance is immobile, and various governance
mechanism are location-bound unlike interna-
tional flows of factors of production, goods and
services that form a core research area of IB. The
focus in traditional international business has been
on labor, capital, and goods, as well as the control
processes around these inputs. Common control
and governance processes facilitate trust within and
outside of a firm. In a repeated game, trust plays a
role that limits defections. Ownership or foreign
direct investment (FDI) in an international business
context is the key to creating a repeated game.
Therefore FDI may facilitate the creation of trust
through the overseas extension of governance
practices.
Corporate governance research from an IB per-
spective has traditionally not considered the mobil-
ity of corporate governance. However, there is a
growing body of theoretical and empirical evidence
pointing out that corporate governance structures
and processes are becoming increasingly mobile
internationally. Mobility of corporate governance
in this context refers to scenarios where firms
export or import governance practices in the pro-
cess of internationalization. For example, a firm
may export its governance practices to its acquisi-
tion target in an overseas location. Likewise, a local
firm may import overseas governance practices by
appointing foreign directors on its board or attract-
ing foreign investors through a cross-listing on a
foreign exchange. In this introduction, we focus on
four related channels through which corporate
governance may be internationally mobile and
highlight the contributions of the papers in this
Special Issue: (1) international mergers and acqui-
sitions (Ellis, Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2017;
Renneboog, Szilagyi, & Vansteenkiste, 2017), (2)
foreign ownership (Aguilera, Desender, Lo´pez-Puer-
tas, & Lee, 2017; Calluzzo, Dong, & Godsell, 2017),
(3) foreign political connections (Sojli & Tham,
2017), and (4) foreign directors (Miletkov, Poulsen,
& Wintoki, 2017). Overall, the recognition of
corporate governance mobility presents an impor-
tant opportunity for further theory building in the
contest of both IB and finance research, and this is a
focal point of this Special Issue.
Further, we build on an established tradition in the
IB and finance areas focused on the role of formal
and informal institutions and show that themobility
of corporate governance is strongly associated with
diverse institutional contexts within firms operate
domestically and globally. As Bell, Filatotchev, &
Aguilera (2014) argue, firms are embedded in differ-
ent national institutional systems, and they experi-
ence divergent degrees of internal and external
pressures to implement a range of governance
mechanisms that are deemed efficient in a specific
national context. Therefore we suggest that formal
institutional factors such as legal or regulatory, as
well as informal (cognitive and cultural) institutions
may shape the process of governance mobility.
Likewise important is that cross-national institu-
tional differences may pose a barrier for an interna-
tional transfer of governance practices.
The ideas of mobile governance in different
institutional contexts form a theoretical founda-
tion for the papers included in this Special Issue.
The call for papers for this Special Issue drew 84
submissions written by authors stemming from 24
nations. Thirteen papers were accepted for a paper
development workshop in London in February
2016, and six of those papers appear in this Special
Issue (an additional three appear in regular JIBS
issues). Taken together, these papers provide a
novel contribution to IB research by focusing on
international dimensions of corporate governance
mobility and the implications of macro-level,
institutional factors on the governance processes
and outcomes across national borders.
This introduction to the Special Issue is organized
as follows. The next section discusses institutional
aspects of corporate governance. The section there-
after discusses the mobility of corporate gover-
nance. We then introduce the specific topics
pertaining to mobility in the case of international
mergers and acquisitions, foreign owners, and
foreign directors. We provide evidence of the
growing importance of these topics in relation to
more traditional topics in international business.
The last section offers concluding remarks and
suggestions for further research.
INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF GOVERNANCE
In their seminal review of corporate governance
research, Shleifer & Vishny (1997 p. 773) provide
the following definition of corporate governance:
‘‘Corporate governance deals with the agency
problem: the separation of management and
finance. The fundamental question of corporate
governance is how to assure financiers that they get
a return on their financial investment.’’ As corpo-
rate governance research has evolved, studies have
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broadened the definition of ‘‘good governance’’ by
considering it as a process-driven function that
facilitates value creation. These processes develop
over time across countries and within firms. The
financial impact of good governance on the firm is
unambiguously positive, both in terms of short-
term efficiency outcomes and longer-term sustain-
ability of the business. Perhaps most intuitive is
that good governance, which minimizes the
chance of managerial tunneling – defined by John-
son, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer (2000) as
the expropriation of corporate assets or profits –
leads to an enhanced capability of the firm to raise
external capital (Aggarwal, Klapper, & Wysocki,
2005). Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick (2003) and
Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell (2009) provide impor-
tant metrics for the robustness of governance at the
firm level and find that good governance firms have
higher firm value, profits, and sales growth. The
finance literature also suggests that good gover-
nance leads to an increase in Tobin’s Q (Daines,
2001) and higher firm value in M&A (Cremers &
Nair, 2005), among other factors. The drivers of
‘‘good governance’’ and its financial benefits can
come from monitoring by the Board of Directors
(see, e.g., Huson, Parrino, & Starks, 2001), institu-
tional investors (see, e.g., Li, Moshirian, Pham, &
Zein, 2006), creditors (Nini, Smith, & Sufi, 2012),
whistle blowers (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales, 2010)
and the market for corporate control (Masulis,
Wang, & Xie, 2012).
Management and IB perspectives have further
broadened research on ‘‘good corporate gover-
nance’’ by considering different organizational
and institutional contexts as well as their effects
on the firm’s internationalization. Some studies, for
example, indicate that monitoring, though impor-
tant, is not the only function of corporate gover-
nance. Indeed, good governance can also be viewed
as having top managerial competency (Kor, 2003)
or investment in firm-specific human capital that
can enhance the quality of decision-making (Ma-
honey & Kor, 2015). Governance is particularly
important to firms in less competitive industries
(Giroud & Mueller, 2011) or in family-controlled
firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Importantly, good
governance provides legitimacy to managerial
actions (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Aguilera & Jackson,
2003) such that investors feel protected from
management consuming private benefits of con-
trol. The extent of this legitimacy can differ across
countries depending on laws, culture and levels of
corruption (Judge, Douglas, & Kutan, 2008).
A growing number of studies suggest that firm-
level governance mechanisms are institutionally
embedded (e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Bell et al.,
2014; McCahery, Sautner, & Starks, 2017), and their
functioning as well as organizational impact may be
different, even in country settings that appear
similar legally. This leads to two significant exten-
sions of previous research based on a universalistic
agency framework. First, governance problems at
the firm level are not universal; they may differ
depending on the firm’s institutional environment.
Second, the effectiveness of governance remedies
aimed at mitigating agency conflicts may depend
on formal and informal institutions. ‘‘Law and
finance’’ research has made the first inroads into
exploring how national settings may lead to differ-
ent firm-level governance models around the world.
In seminal papers, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000) and La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Pop-Eleches, & Shleifer (2004)
suggest that legal origin is influential in a nation’s
protection of outside investors (investors other
than management or controlling shareholders),
which the authors suggest is largely the purpose
of corporate governance. Though legal tradition
(‘‘common law’’ and ‘‘civil law’’) succeeds in
explaining many cross-sectional differences in cor-
porate finance, critics argue that these broad cate-
gories belie the true complexity of a nation’s legal
system. The US and UK economies serve as a good
example. While both countries belong to the same
‘‘Anglo-Saxon’’ model of corporate governance,
describing their legal environment solely as com-
mon law ignores differences in formal and informal
‘‘rules of the game’’ that may significantly impact
the forms and efficacy of corporate governance
mechanisms in the two countries. Consistent with
this notion, Short & Keasey (1999) suggest that
managers in the UK become entrenched at higher
ownership levels than managers in the US. They
attribute this difference to better monitoring and
fewer firm-level takeover defenses in the UK. Bru-
ton et al. (2010) and Cumming &Walz (2010) show
that performance outcomes of ownership concen-
tration and retained ownership by private equity
investors may differ depending on the legal system
and institutional characteristics of the private
equity industry in a specific country.
Characteristics of Boards of Directors, such as
goals, structure and representation may likewise be
expected to differ across institutional contexts,
even within broad institutional categories.
Wymeersch (1998), for example, finds that in some
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countries, the law does not specifically dictate the
role of the board of directors, so its priorities may
well differ from the typical shareholder wealth
maximization. Regarding board structure, some
jurisdictions have two-tier boards while others have
unitary boards. Rose (2005) suggests that the uni-
tary (or one-tier) boards are typically from common
law nations and two-tier boards predominate in
civil law nations, however, Danish firms have
adopted aspects of both. Moreover, O’Hare (2003)
suggests that there may be an increase in oversight
if firms with unitary systems change to a two-tier
structure. Regarding representation on boards,
nations differ with regard to their take on the
wisdom of including directors that are insiders
versus outsiders (Adams & Ferreira, 2007) as well as
local versus global (Masulis et al., 2012).
A large literature, much of it in the accounting
field, suggests that information environment,
which includes the extent of corporate disclosure,
reporting standards, the reliability of financial
reporting, etc., is important to corporate gover-
nance (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; Leuz &
Wysocki, 2016). Corporate disclosure of informa-
tion through publicly accessible accounting state-
ments serves to enhance investor trust (Bushman &
Smith, 2001). Much of this literature examines the
use of financial accounting in managerial incentive
contracts. This research has been examined in the
context of takeovers (Palepu, 1986), boards of
directors (Anderson et al., 2004), shareholder liti-
gation (Skinner, 1994) and debt contracts (Smith &
Warner, 1979). The worldwide adoption of Inter-
national Financial Reporting Standards has been an
important development in this literature and has
motivated research in this area. The positive impact
of enhancing reporting standards around the globe
is arguably evidence consistent with the notion
that disclosure is an important mechanism in
corporate governance.
Related to both the finance and accounting
literature, the legal structure in a nation plays a
central role in corporate governance of firms.
Though firms may adapt to poor legal environ-
ments individually (Coase, 1960), research suggests
that regulation leads firms to develop good gover-
nance. Mandatory disclosure can serve to reveal the
true quality of a firm overall, and even managers at
that firm (Wang, 2010). Firms can opt into regula-
tory environments by bonding to external legal
environments that enhance legal requirements
(e.g., with cross-listing) or opt out through going
private, delisting or even foreign incorporation.
Much of this literature examines changes in regu-
lation in the US such as Regulation Fair Disclosure
and Sarbanes–Oxley, but there are some interna-
tional studies, such as Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki
(2003) and Dyck & Zingales (2004) that corroborate
the positive association between corporate gover-
nance and a legal system that mandates disclosure.
Some studies highlight the costs of regulation, both
direct and indirect (e.g., Coates & Srinivasan,
2014), suggesting that the mandatory nature of
disclosure is not as straightforward as its relation to
corporate governance might imply.
To summarize, prior law, economics, finance and
IB studies not only explore efficiency and effective-
ness of various governance practices, but also
identify significant national differences in how
these practices are implemented at the firm level.
In the following sections, we take this collective
body of research a step further and discuss how
national differences may facilitate or create barriers
for the mobility of governance practices across
national borders.
MOBILITY OF GOVERNANCE
An integration of the mainstream IB research with
institutional theory from finance, law and eco-
nomics, provides new interesting dimensions to the
discussion of corporate governance mobility. Tra-
ditional IB studies have identified how different
forms of institutional distance may affect the way
MNCs tap into international factors markets and
develop their strategies in terms of global diversi-
fication of their product and services (Brouthers,
2002; Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005). What is
not clear, however, is how these institutional
factors may affect the exporting of governance
and its implications.
Given the predominant focus in extant literature
on internal, organizational aspects of corporate
governance, there is limited prior work on potential
roles of the firm’s institutional environments in
terms of their impact on the link between gover-
nance factors, international business strategy and
ultimately performance. Aguilera & Jackson (2003),
for example, suggest that because business organi-
zations are embedded in different national institu-
tional systems, they will experience divergent
degrees of internal and external pressures to imple-
ment a range of governance mechanisms that are
deemed efficient in a specific national context.
Therefore contrary to the universalistic predictions
of agency-grounded research, different social,
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political and historic macro-factors may lead to the
institutionalization of very different views of firms’
role in society as well as what strategic actions and
their outcomes should be considered as acceptable.
More recent sociology-grounded research sug-
gests that governance is a product not only of
coordinative demands imposed by market effi-
ciency, but also of rationalized norms legitimizing
the adoption of appropriate governance practices
(Bell et al., 2014). Legitimacy is the ‘‘generalized
perception or assumption that the actions of an
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate, within
some socially- constructed system of norms, values,
beliefs, and definitions’’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).
This perspective focuses less attention on the
individual efficiency outcomes of structural gover-
nance characteristics that are at the core of agency
perspective, and instead concentrates more on
theoretical efforts to understand how governance
mechanisms affect the firm’s legitimacy through
perceptions of external assessors, or the stakeholder
‘‘audiences’’.
Research within institutional theory and social
psychology fields differentiates between various
types of legitimacy judgments that include, in
addition to instrumental (pragmatic), also cogni-
tive and moral dimensions. More specifically,
institutional theorists predict that regulative, nor-
mative and cognitive institutions put pressure on
firms to compete for resources on the basis of
economic efficiency. However, institutional pres-
sures may also compel firms to conform to expected
social behavior and demands of a wider body of
stakeholders. In other words, the ability of organi-
zation to achieve social acceptance will depend on,
in addition to efficiency concerns, the ability of its
governance systems to commit to stewardship
management practices, stakeholders’ interests, and
societal expectations.
These theoretical arguments may have far-reach-
ing implications for corporate governance in an IB
context. First, the firm’s quest for legitimacy may
lead to changes in its corporate governance prac-
tices and processes. For example, some firms, in
addition to enhancing the monitoring capacity of
boards, may also incorporate stakeholder engage-
ment mechanisms into their formal governance
structures by assigning responsibility for sustain-
ability to the board and forming a separate board
committee for sustainability. Consistent with this
notion, the co-determination system of corporate
boards in Germany ensures that representatives of
key stakeholders, including employees, have a
direct say in governance matters. A system of
remuneration that involves not only financial
performance benchmarks, but also factors associ-
ated with longer-term sustainability may be
another governance factor contributing to moral
legitimacy. Similarly, some companies introduce
wider performance criteria and definitions of risk in
their risk-movement systems that use non-financial
indicators. Therefore unlike studies in finance,
economics, and strategy fields, institutional frame-
work considers corporate governance as an endoge-
nous, socially-embedded mechanism that may be
highly responsive to various legitimacy pressures
(Filatotchev & Nakajima, 2014).
These arguments shed new light on our notion of
internationally mobile corporate governance by
suggesting that firms may adjust their governance
mechanisms strategically when venturing into
overseas factor and product markets. For example,
Moore, Bell, Filatotchev, & Rasheed (2012) advance
a comparative institutional perspective to explain
capital market choice by firms going public via
initial public offering (IPO) in a foreign market.
Based on a sample of 103 US and 99 UK foreign
IPOs during the period 2002–2006, they find that
internal governance characteristics (founder-CEO,
executive incentives, and board independence) and
external network characteristics (prestigious under-
writers, degree of venture capitalist syndication,
and board interlocks) are significant predictors of
foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms.
Their results suggest foreign IPO firms select a host
market where its governance characteristics and
third party affiliations fit the host market’s institu-
tional environment. The basis for evaluating such
fit is the extent to which isomorphic pressures exist
for firm attributes and characteristics to meet
legitimacy standards in host markets. Thus differ-
ences in internal governance characteristics and
external ties are associated with strategic capital
market choices such that an increased fit results in a
higher likelihood of choosing one market over
another. In other words, when firms select between
different stock markets for their foreign IPO, they
try to ‘‘import’’ governance standards that they
perceive as more legitimate by investors in a
specific market. These findings are particularly
important given that Syvrud, Knill, Jens, & Colak
(2012) find that, on average, foreign IPOs result in
less proceeds.
Further, research by Bell et al. (2014) focuses
on legitimacy in the stock market, where investor
perceptions of the foreign IPO firm’s overall
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legitimacy fall at the intersection of the cognitive
and regulatory institutional domains. These
domains are aligned with the firms’ governance
bundle and its home country legal environment,
respectively. IPO firms originating from countries
with institutional environments granting weak
minority shareholder protections, such as China
or Russia, will have to adopt a larger number of
governance practices to gain the same level of
legitimacy as IPOs from strong governance juris-
dictions. This international mobility of firm- and
macro-level governance factors can go both ways.
In a more recent paper, Krause, Filatotchev, &
Bruton (2016) observe that institutional character-
istics of foreign product markets influence the
structure of boards of directors of US firms active
in these markets. They argue that allocating greater,
outwardly visible power to the CEO will build the
firm’s legitimacy among customers who are cultur-
ally more comfortable with high levels of power
distance. Scholars rarely conceptualize boards as
tools firms can use to manage product markets’
demand-side uncertainty, but the results of this
study suggest they should. Further, existing
research in comparative corporate governance
(e.g., Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) has argued that
national institutions affect firm-level governance
mechanisms, but this research also focuses almost
exclusively on home country institutions. Clearly,
institutional characteristics of foreign product mar-
kets can also have an effect on a firm’s governance,
even if the firm is incorporated and headquartered
in the United States.
To summarize, the legitimacy perspective suggests
novel dimensions to the notion of corporate gover-
nancemobility. From the agency perspective, MNCs
may export/import corporate governance to obtain
access to superior resources and achieve efficiency
outcomes. For example, by importing foreign direc-
tors, firms in emerging markets can gain access to
enhanced managerial expertise and monitoring
capabilities that may help them to be more compet-
itive in an international market (Giannetti, Liao, &
Yu, 2015). In addition, from an institutional per-
spective, MNCs may adjust their governance sys-
tems to adhere to expectations and governance
standards in a foreign product and factor markets,
and therefore increase their legitimacy among local
stakeholders, including investors and customers.
These two perspectives differentiating between effi-
ciency and legitimacy are not orthogonal, and the
extent of governance mobility is determined by a
complex interplay of firm- and industry-level
factors, as well as financial, legal and cognitive
institutions in the home and host countries.
Institutional factors may also create significant
barriers for corporate governance mobility. In terms
of formal institutions, differences in national gov-
ernance regulations may impede a transfer of
governance practices across national borders. For
example, until recently the Chinese government
imposed restrictions on foreign ownership of local
companies that had a limiting effect on how much
influence Western institutional investors may have
when deciding on various governance matters.
Differences in informal institutions, such as cul-
ture, may also create barriers for the transfer of
governance when, for example, imported gover-
nance practices are not considered locally as legit-
imate. Cultural differences influence governance
not only directly, but also indirectly through its
influence over time in shaping institutions. For
example, culture can influence governance and
other managerial decision-making through beliefs
or values that influence individual agents’ percep-
tions, preferences, and behaviors. As a result,
culture ultimately affects the utilities of agent’s
choices, both at the individual level and-as frictions
are always present-at the firm and national levels,
when local players may have difficulties adopting
best governance practices due to behavioral and
cognitive biases. Culture also affects governance
and managerial decision-making by influencing
national institutions, which can be viewed as a
path-dependent result of cultural influences and
historical events (David, 1994). Recent examples
surround governance tensions in Japan, China and
other South-East Asia economies between local
investors on one hand, and foreign board members
and CEOs coming from the Western economies,
indicating that cultural differences may create
barriers for the transfer of ‘‘good governance’’
concepts that local participants in corporate gover-
nance mechanisms find difficult to accept.
Although our emphasis here was on how institu-
tional factors may facilitate the transfer of corpo-
rate governance, institutional barriers to this
transfer represent an important but relatively less
explored area.
SPECIFIC MODES OF TRANSFERRING
GOVERNANCE
If the firm-level corporate governance structures
and their organizational outcomes in terms of
strategies and performance are institutionally
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embedded, then the extent of governance mobility
as well as its effects on exporting/receiving firms is
far from universal. They may depend on institu-
tional differences in home/host locations. Exactly
how institutional factors affect the mobility of
corporate governance and its implications depends
on firm-level corporate governance, the mode(s) in
which corporate governance is transferred, and the
institutional environments from and to which
governance is transferred.
The mobility of governance depends on the
mechanisms used partly because there is differen-
tial evidence on the extent to which governance
can be learned, copied, or imitated. Consistent with
this notion, Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz (2007) find
significant heterogeneity in firm-level corporate
governance within countries. Prior research has
shown that investors themselves learn about the
value of governance, and as such the returns to
investment based on governance disappear over
time. Indeed, Subramanian (2004) shows that the
advantages to incorporating in Delaware differ
across small versus large firms and disappear over
time (counter to Daines, 2001). Bebchuk, Cohen, &
Wang (2013) show that the value of the Gompers
et al. (2003) governance index in predicting stock
returns over time disappears as investors learn
about the value of such governance; that is, the
price of well governed stocks goes up and the
returns go down. Nevertheless, while investors
appear to learn about the value of governance, it
is difficult for some firms to observe, learn, and
adopt best practices in governance due to differ-
ences in internal process of the firm, behavioral and
cognitive biases which limit the ability to copy well
(Amin & Cohendet, 2000; Klapper & Love, 2004).
Learning is local, requires skill acquisition, accli-
mation to the right mindset, interactions with the
right people, and a thirst for external reputation.
Also, learning requires overcoming bad gover-
nance. For example, Romano (2005) suggests that
there are mistakes made by policymakers when
they adopt minimum governance standards. Policy
implications on governance standards is a partisan
topic, however. Involved in these policies are two
controversial topics: globalization versus national-
ization, and government involvement in the cor-
porate world. The law and economics/finance
literature is fairly consistent in their conclusion
that legal institutions, both public and private (La
Porta et al., 2006; Jackson & Roe, 2009; Cumming,
Knill, & Richardson, 2015), are good for firm access
to capital and financial development in general.
Consistent with this notion, policymakers who find
this research compelling should support legislation
supporting the exporting or importing of good
corporate governance, especially in nations where
legal institutions are lacking.
At the same time, fairly recent events, such as the
Great Recession, ‘‘Brexit’’ in the UK and an increase
in the popularity of nationalism among citizens in
some nations have moved some policymakers to
take a more protective stance with regard to foreign
ownership. As international trade and capital flows
contract, the International Monetary Fund
acknowledges that globalization is not without
risks. Taking into consideration both of these
trends, it is difficult to discuss with any specificity
global policy implications.
In this Special Issue, the papers comprise analyses
of four types of international transfer of corporate
governance: international M&As (Ellis et al., 2017;
Renneboog et al., 2017), foreign investors (Aguilera
et al., 2017; Calluzzo et al., 2017, foreign political
connections (Sojli & Tham, 2017) and foreign
directors (Miletkov et al., 2017).
The popularity of the international M&A litera-
ture has been growing markedly over time. Figure 1
shows that articles that reference international
business in general have declined over time relative
to articles that reference international acquisitions,
shareholder rights, and creditor rights. Some key
papers in the literature on international M&As and
related topics of loans and creditor rights are
summarized in Table 1. Esty & Megginson (2003),
Bae & Goyal (2009), Haselmann, Pistor, & Vig
(2010), Cumming, Lopez-de-Silanes, McCahery, &
Schwienbacher (2015), and Qi, Roth, & Wald
(2017) show that loan structures and debt tranch-
ing depend significantly on creditor rights and
shareholder rights. In turn, international M&As,
which are often financed with significant leverage,
depend on access to debt finance and international
levels of creditor and investor protection. Bris &
Cabolis (2008) and Martynova & Renneboog (2008)
find evidence that the cross border mergers have a
higher impact on target firms share prices in
countries with better investor protection, and when
the target is from a country of better investor
protection. In the context of leveraged buyouts
(LOBs), however, Cao, Cumming, & Qian (2014)
find evidence that cross-border LBOs are more
common from strong creditor rights countries to
weak creditor rights countries. Further, LBO premi-
ums are lower in countries with stronger creditor
rights and lower among cross-border deals. Cao,
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Cumming, Goh, & Qian (2015) show that the
impact of country-level investor protection on deal
premiums is stronger for LBO than non-LBO
transactions.
Two papers in this Special Issue contribute to this
literature on cross-border M&As. Ellis et al. (2017)
show that acquirers benefit from good country
governance, such that the acquirer’s stock price
reaction to acquisitions increases with the country
level governance distance between the acquirer and
the target. Renneboog et al. (2017) examine the
impact of M&As on bondholders. Bondholder
returns are larger in countries with stronger creditor
rights and more efficient claims enforcement.
These papers are important, as they show that the
country-level distance between the acquirer and
target affects the magnitude of transfer of gover-
nance, and this benefit is shared by shareholders
and bondholders alike.
Table 2 highlights key papers in the literature on
foreign ownership, foreign political connections,
and foreign directors. Figure 2 shows that these
topics have been substantially increasing in popu-
larity over time, in contrast to work on directors
more generally for example, which has been in
relative decline in recent years. Foreign investors
focus on different types of stocks, as shown in early
work by Kang & Stulz (1997). Foreign investors do
not destabilize markets (Choe, Kho, & Stulz, 1999).
Foreign investment reduces the cost of capital
(Stulz, 1999), and financial integration across coun-
tries lowers transactions costs and greater economic
welfare (Martin & Rey, 2000), even though foreign
money managers have transaction costs disadvan-
tages (Choe, Kho, & Stulz, 2005). Foreign investors
increase the expected value of private firms backed
by venture capitalists (Cumming, Knill, & Syvrud,
2016), The positive effect of foreign ownership on
firm value has been attributed to larger sharehold-
ers and higher long term commitment and involve-
ment of such shareholders (Douma, George, &
Kabir, 2006); however, in some cases international
ownership is associated with deficient environmen-
tal standards (Dean, Lovely, & Wang, 2009).
Cross-listing enables foreign ownership, and
firms to bond to higher governance standards
abroad to take advantage of more stringent securi-
ties laws in a host country’s capital markets (Coffee,
2002; Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2004; Doidge et al.,
2007; Karolyi, 2012; Pagano, Roell, & Zechner,
Figure 1 Google Scholar hits on international acquisitions, creditor rights, and related topics. This figure displays the number of
Google Scholar hits as a percentage of the hits in 2008 for different search terms: Acquisitions (54,100 hits in 2008), International
Acquisitions (290 in 2008), Creditor Rights (835 in 2008), Shareholder Rights (1380 in 2008), Shell Companies (288 in 2008), and
International Business (134,000 in 2008).
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2002). But the bonding explanation is incomplete
as not all firms desire to cross-list (Coffee, 2002),
and there is still a large effect of local national
governance on firm value amongst firms that do
cross-list (Cumming, Hou, & Wu, 2017). Interna-
tional adoption of other jurisdictions’ monitoring
technology (Cumming & Johan, 2008) and regula-
tions (Cumming, Johan, & Li, 2011) can enable the
international transfer of governance and superior
stock market outcomes such as new listings and
liquidity. Regulators adopt from other jurisdictions
monitoring technology (Cumming & Johan, 2008)
and regulations (Cumming et al., 2011) that enable
superior governance and stock market outcomes.
The mobility of governance is also facilitated by
the increasing internationalization of the investor
base. Specifically, global investors include sover-
eign wealth funds (SWFs), such as United Arab
Emirates’s Abu-Dubai Investment Authority. SWFs
may enforce governance standards in their portfo-
lio firms that are different to the general gover-
nance practices in a specific location (Knill, Lee, &
Mauck, 2012). Moreover, SWFs have a differential
preference for private firms without a stock
exchange listing, particularly in countries with
lower legal standards (Johan, Knill, & Mauck,
2013), where the lack of transparency is suggestive
of greater agency problems. Once companies
become publicly listed, there is substantially more
information released to the market, depending on
the legal and cultural factors in a particular country
(Boulton, Smart, & Zutter, 2017).
Another mechanism that can transfer gover-
nance includes CEO migration. MNCs can export
monitoring technology and similar practices across
national borders, and CEOs that have experience in
foreign countries with stronger institutional envi-
ronments may transfer knowledge about good
governance (Cumming, Duan, Hou, & Rees,
2015). Generally, internal control systems and
processes can be learned, therefore they are trans-
ferable/exportable, particularly in the context of
emerging markets (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, &Wright,
2000; John & Senbet, 1998).
Further, foreign directors represent another chan-
nel of governance mobility as they may bring good
governance standards from their home countries to
the focal firm, especially if it is located in a country
with low governance standards (Giannetti et al.,
2015). Foreign directors have been shown to pos-
itively impact firm performance (Choi, Park, & Yoo,
2007), particularly when foreign directors have
higher levels of foreign degrees and politicalTa
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connections (Rhee & Lee, 2008). There is some
contrasting evidence, however, that while foreign
directors make better M&A decisions, they are less
often engaged in firm activities thereby worsening
performance and requiring more earnings restate-
ments, among other problems (Masulis et al., 2012).
Four important papers in this Special Issue con-
tribute to the literature on foreign investors, foreign
directors, and political connections. Aguilera et al.
(2017) show that, in the presence of foreign investors,
managers tend to be more optimistic in their early
earnings forecasts, but have more long-term and
timely adjustments relatively and avoid making last
minute decisions. Calluzzo et al. (2017) show that
sovereign wealth funds are attracted to firms that are
more engaged in campaign finance, and hence can
have a political influence in the target firm’s country.
Sojli & Tham (2017) show that foreign political
connections create large increases in firm value,
improve access to foreign markets, and improve
access to government contracts. Foreign boardmem-
bers coming from countries with more advanced
institutions may export good governance to a local
firm operating in a relatively less advanced institu-
tional environment, and this improvement may be
stronger when institutional differences between ‘‘ex-
porting’’ and ‘‘importing’’ countries are high (Mile-
tkov et al., 2017). These papers show that the identity
of foreign owners is significant and may have inter-
play with foreign directors and political connections,
and can substantially influence the governance and
performance of firms in different institutional envi-
ronments. All of these papers show that governance is
mobile and a key competitive advantage.
Last but certainly not least, it is important to note
that bad governance is also internationally mobile.
Allred, Findley, Nielsen, & Sharman (2017) show that
many firms flaunt international standards by setting
up internationally shell corporations. Even among
OECD countries, there are substantial numbers of
shell companies that are not compliant with interna-
tional standards. Tax haven based firms, by contrast,
aremore compliantwith international standards. The
popularity of research on shell companies is growing
significantly (Fig. 1). Future research could continue
to seek a better understanding of the causes and
consequences of these shell companies.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our review of the literature suggests that mobility
of corporate governance is very context specific in
respect of the country level institutional conditionsTa
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as well as the mode of international governance
transfer. Insights into the causes and consequences
of firm-specific international governance transfer
can be gleaned from interdisciplinary analyses
involving law, finance, management and related
fields. There is a massive scope for further work on
topic that makes use of these interdisciplinary
perspectives that we have highlighted here.
In this introduction, we specifically emphasized
four main ways in which governance is interna-
tionally mobile: international M&As, foreign inves-
tors, foreign directors, and foreign political
connections. These related topics are the focus of
the important papers in this Special Issue. As a
limitation we note that these four channels are not
the only ways in which governance practices may
be transferred across countries. For example, prior
studies identify other channels of the transfer of
corporate governance, such as the proliferation of
governance codes around the globe and the har-
monization of accounting standards, which have
been discussed in the related literature. Future IB
studies should develop a more holistic picture of
the mobility of corporate governance by looking at
these diverse channels.
Examining multi-stakeholder perspective may
reveal new important dimensions of the mobility
of corporate governance, bearing in mind that the
traditional view of corporate governance is heavily
anchored on mechanisms for solving agency prob-
lems arising from conflicting interests between top
management and outside shareholders. Debates
about US-based board governance, including its
optimal size, composition, and independence, are
largely influenced by this convention. However,
agency conflicts arising from other stakeholders
have implications for the design of corporate gover-
nance intended to solve managerial agency prob-
lems. For instance, in an environment where we also
have debt agencyproblems (Djankov et al., 2008), an
optimally designed corporate board should repre-
sent a balance between the interests of outside
shareholders and outside debtholders. Debtholder
representation on the board is observed frequently
Figure 2 Google Scholar hits on foreign directors, foreign shareholders, and related topics. This figure displays the number of Google
Scholar hits as a percentage of the hits in 2008 for different search terms: Directors (84,300 hits in 2008), Foreign Directors (84 in
2008), Shareholders (32,400 in 2008), Foreign Shareholders (438 in 2008), Political Connections (2370 in 2008), and Sovereign
Wealth Funds (1510 in 2008).
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outside the U.S. and U.K. corporate sectors, and
future research may explore how some elements of
the multi-stakeholder governance model can be
transmitted from one country to another within
the context of MNE global operations.
The papers in this Special Issue highlight impor-
tant managerial and policy implications associated
with the mobility of governance. International
acquisitions benefit both acquirer and target firms,
and particularly those firms with a greater institu-
tional distance between them (Ellis et al., 2017;
Renneboog et al., 2017). Foreign investors affect
managerial behavior (Aguilera et al., 2017), and can
have a political influence (Calluzzo et al., 2017).
Foreign political connections positively affect firm
value (Sojli & Tham, 2017). Foreign directors can
positively affect firm value, particularly in countries
with weak legal standards (Miletkov et al., 2017).
The only negative aspect of mobility of governance
is seen with the establishment of shell companies
that are common and not compliant with interna-
tional standards (Allred et al., 2017). Policymakers
should work to encourage mobility of governance.
At the same time, regulators could further cooper-
ate to enforce international standards to prevent
improper governance standards from being trans-
ferred across countries. Given recent events such as
the Global Financial Crisis and all of its implica-
tions, this balance in policy could prove particu-
larly challenging.
The impact of financial regulation on governance
is particularly important in the contest of financial
firms. To the extent that countries and regions vary
in terms of regulatory schemes, the governance
structure varies accordingly. Again, this is one
example where the interaction between multiple
agents and stakeholders matters in the design and
mobility of governance. In fact, the design of bank
management compensation and its incentive fea-
tures play a vital role in the design of optimal
banking regulation (John, Saunders, Senbet, 2000).
Traditional banking regulation focuses on a two-
party game with conflicting interests between the
bank and the regulator.However, bankmanagement
is the key decision maker, and the bank risk
incentives depend on the incentive structure of
bankmanagement compensation. John et al. (2000)
show that, if these incentive features (e.g., bonus,
salary, equity participation) are an input to the
pricing of deposit insurance, an optimal banking
regulation can be designed. Thus, the transmission
mechanisms for governance mobility are broader
when financial firms are considered. They arise
from cross-border regulation and regulatory
coordination.
In addition, development partners, as well as
international financial institutions, such as the IMF
and World Bank, can be transmission sources of
governance for developing economies. This arises
partly through technical assistance in financial
sector development programs, but extends into
non-financial firms as well. The quality of corporate
governance is among the design features in the
reform of financial systems in developing countries.
This suggests an interesting research question into
the relationship between governance and financial
developmentwith a focus on low income countries.
To conclude, this Special Issue poses important
questions for corporate governance researchers in
all of the respective fields, including IB, finance,
economics, accounting and law. With the growing
scale and scope of internationalization of business
activities, the challenges facing executives in the
global arena are considerably more demanding
than those encountered in a domestic environ-
ment. The global context increases the diversity of
stakeholders whose interests must be considered as
well as the complexity of the governance problems
facing MNCs and their leaders. Furthermore, com-
panies competing in the global marketplace face a
fundamental dilemma – how to balance the need
for global consistency in corporate governance
practices with the need to be sensitive to the
demands and expectations of local stakeholders
(Filatotchev & Stahl, 2015). Finding the appropriate
balance between these competing demands is not
always easy, and papers in this Special Issue help to
map out future research directions in this increas-
ingly important field.
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